2.3 Come messaggio di qualcuno cuddli The Paradox of 101 Dalmatians

Is Oscar-minus a dog? Why then should we deny that Oscar-minus is verso dog? We saw above that one possible response esatto Chrysippus’ paradox was onesto claim that Oscar-minus does not exist at \(t’\). But even if we adopt this view, how does it follow that Oscar-minus, existing as it does at \(t\), is not a dog? Yet if Oscar-minus is per dog, then, given the norma account of identity, there are two dogs where we would normally count only one. Mediante fact, for each of Oscar’s hairs, of which there are at least 101, there is per proper part of Oscar – Oscar minus per hair – which is just as much a dog as Oscar-minus.

There are then at least 101 dogs (and con fact many more) where we would count only one. Some claim that things such as dogs are “maximal. One might conclude as much simply preciso avoid multiplying the number of dogs populating the space reserved for Oscar alone. But the maximality principle may seem esatto be independently justified as well. When Oscar barks, do all these different dogs bark mediante unison? If verso thing is verso dog, shouldn’t it be court of independent action? Yet Oscar-minus cannot act independently of Oscar. Nevertheless, David Lewis (1993) has suggested a reason for counting Oscar-minus and all the 101 dog parts that differ (mediante various different ways) from one another and Oscar by verso hair, as dogs, and per fact as Dalmatians (Oscar is a Dalmatian).

Lewis invokes Unger’s (1980) “problem of the many. His hairs loosen and then dislodge, some such remaining still sopra place. Hence, within Oscar’s compass at any given time there are congeries of Dalmatian parts sooner or later onesto become definitely Dalmatians; some con verso day, some con verso second, or a split second. It seems arbitrary puro proclaim a Dalmatian part that is per split second away from becoming definitely per Dalmatian, a Dalmatian, while denying that one per day away is a Dalmatian. As Lewis puts it, we must either deny that the “many” are Dalmatians, or we must deny that the Dalmatians are many. Lewis endorses proposals of both types but seems sicuro favor one of the latter type according to which the Dalmatians are not many but rather “almost one” Mediante any case, the standard account of identity seems unable on its own esatto handle the paradox of 101 Dalmatians.

It requires that we either deny that Oscar minus a hair is per dog – and per Dalmatian – or else that we must affirm that there is per multiplicity of Dalmatians, all but one of which is incapable of independent action and all of which bark in unison per niente more loudly than Oscar barks macchia.

2.4 The Paradox of Constitution

Suppose that on day 1 Jones purchases per piece of clay \(c\) and fashions it into per statue \(s_1\). On day 2, Jones destroys \(s_1\), but not \(c\), by squeezing \(s_1\) into per ball and fashions verso new statue \(s_2\) out of \(c\). On day 3, Jones removes per part of \(s_2\), discards it, and replaces it using per new piece of clay, thereby destroying \(c\) and replacing it by verso new piece of clay, \(c’\). Presumably, \(s_2\) survives this change. Now what is the relationship between the pieces of clay and the statues they “constitute?” A natural answer is: identity. On day \(1, c\) is identical preciso \(s_1\) and on day \(2, c\) is identical esatto \(s_2\). On day \(3, s_2\) is identical sicuro \(c’\). But this conclusion directly contradicts NI. If, on day \(1, c\) is (identical sicuro) \(s_1\), then it follows, given NI, that on day \(2, s_1\) is \(s_2\) (since \(c\) is identical to \(s_2\) on day 2) and hence that \(s_1\) exists on day 2, which it does not. By per similar argument, on day \(3, c\) is \(c’\) (since \(s_2\) is identical preciso both) and so \(c\) exists on day 3, which it does not. We might conclude, then, that either constitution is not identity or that NI is false. Neither conclusion is wholly welcome. Once we adopt the canone account less NI, the latter principle follows directly from the assumption that individual variables and constants per quantified modal logic are sicuro be handled exactly as they are con first-order logic. And if constitution is not identity, and yet statues, as well as pieces of clay, are physical objects (and what else would they be?), then we are again forced to affirm that distinct physical objects addirittura time. The statue \(s_1\) and the piece of clay \(c\) occupy the same space on day 1. Even if this is deemed possible (Wiggins 1980), it is unparsimonious. The canone account is thus inizialmente facie incompatible with the natural intenzione that constitution is identity.